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Baldonado v. Wynn Las Vegas, 124 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 81 (Oct. 9, 
2008)1 
 
EMPLOYMENT LAW – ENFORCEMENT OF LABOR 
STATUTES 
 
Summary 
  
Consolidated appeals from a district court order granting summary judgment on statutory, 
contract, and declaratory relief claims in a class action employment law matter and from a post-
judgment order denying attorney fees and costs.   
Disposition/Outcome 
d the district court’s summary judgment order and order denying attorney’s fees. 
actual and Procedural History 
  
 Affirme
 
F  
as Vegas employs appellants Daniel Baldonado and Joseph Cesarz as table game 
s to 
d 
served the right to change, supplement, or 
elimina
 
modifie
yees 
                                                
  
 Wynn L
dealers.  Appellants claim that they began working as dealers at Wynn Las Vegas when it first 
opened for business in April 2005.  On March 25, 2005, the Wynn issued a toke2 polling and 
distribution policy describing the manner that employee tokes, or tips, would be collected, 
calculated, and distributed.3  The March 25 policy provided that any proposed modification
the policy should be voted on and approved by “Table Games Management” and then by a 
majority of the voting dealers.4  An April 13, 2005, policy generally prohibited managers an
supervisors from accepting or receiving any tokes.   
However, the Wynn’s employee handbook re
te any of its policy.  This provision was used in August 2006 when the Wynn attempted 
to remedy an anomaly: table game dealers were earning more than their supervisors when tips 
were included in the dealers’ compensation.  The new modification would combine the pit 
manager and floor supervisor positions to create a “casino services team lead” position and 
would allow each service team to collect a portion of the daily toke pool.  “Box persons” or 
“craps team leads” also received a portion of the daily toke pool.  The remaining portion was
then distributed to the dealers.5  The modified policy was effectuated on September 1, 2006.   
The dealers responded by instituting a class action against the Wynn, claiming that the 
d toke policy reduced their compensation and violated NRS 608.160 (unlawful for 
employers to take employees’ tips), NRS 608.100 (unlawful for employers to require emplo
 
1 By Brianna F. Issurdutt 
2 The policy defined a “toke(tip)” as “any money, whether coin or cash extended to an employee in recognition of, 
or in appreciation for, a job well done.” 
3 The process was outlined as follows: First, the tips were collected over a 24-hour period and counted by a dealer-
elected committee.  Then, the tips were distributed amongst the dealers based on hours worked and accrued vacation 
and sick time. 
4 “Table Games Management” had the authority to veto any change that was not in the Wynn’s best interest. 
5 The Wynn claims that these policy modifications decreased the dealers’ daily toke shares by 10 to 15 percent, 
which resulted in an overall salary reduction. 
to rebate compensation earned and paid), and NRS 613.120 (unlawful for managers and shift 
bosses to receive gratuities from employees as a condition of employees’ employment).  The 
dealers sought compensatory and punitive damages, along with any appropriate injunctive or 
equitable relief for the alleged statutory violations and breach contract, the contractual and 
tortious breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and also in relation to
request for declaratory relief.    
The dealers then moved 
 their 
for partial summary judgment and a preliminary injunction to 
declare
he 
 the dealers’ 
motion
r 
hat the 
ict court’s order dismissing their complaint.   The 
Wynn m
 
ort Workers 
Union 
 Douglass concluded that the district court properly refused 
to allow
iscussion
 the modified policy void under NRS 608.160, NRS 613.120, and unenforceable as 
against public policy.  The Wynn moved to dismiss the complaint or, in the alternative, for 
summary judgment, arguing that no private cause of action existed per the alleged statutory 
violations because the statutes were only enforceable by the Nevada Labor Commissioner.  T
Wynn also argued that the dealers were at-will employees with no contractual relationship on 
which to base their breach of contract claims.  The dealers opposed both motions. 
The district court heard the parties’ arguments and entered an order denying
 and granting the Wynn’s motion.  The district court agreed that the statutes that the 
dealers relied on provided no private causes of action and noted that the Labor Commissione
enforces the specified statutes.  The district court stated that the dealers must follow the 
administrative process before seeking relief in the district court.  Lastly, the court found t
dealers were at-will employees with no written employment contracts and therefore the Wynn 
had the right to change the tip-pooling policy. 
The dealers are appealing from the distr 6
oved for attorneys’ fees under NRS 18.010(2)(b), claiming that the dealers brought and 
maintained their claims without reasonable grounds.  The dealers opposed the motion.  The 
district court denied the request for fees because it found that the claims were not brought or
maintained without reasonable grounds.  The Wynn has appealed from that order.7 
After briefing was completed, the appeals were consolidated and the Transp
of America and former State Assembly members Donald Mello and Jack Lund Schofield 
were allowed to file amicus briefs. 
For an en banc court, Justice
 the dealers’ claims proceed to trial and the district court did not abuse its discretion in 
denying attorney fees and therefore affirmed the district court’s decision. 
 
D  
There were 2 main issues for the Nevada Supreme Court to decide: (1) whether the 
 
 
                                                
 
 
district court properly dismissed the dealers’ complaint (specifically, whether NRS 608.160
implies a private cause of action, whether the dealers appropriately sought declaratory relief,
whether the dealers demonstrated a viable claim for breach of employment contracts) and (2) 
whether the district court’s order denying attorney fees was correct.  
 
 
6 The appeal was assigned Docket No. 48831. 
7 The appeal was assigned Docket No. 49241. 
(1) Appeal from the district court’s order dismissing appellants’ complaint 
 
 The Court reviewed the summary judgment order de novo.8  The summary judgment 
order will stand only if, after reviewing the record in the light most favorable to the appellants, 
no genuine issues of material facts remained, entitling the Wynn to judgment as a matter of law.9 
 First, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the dealers had no private cause of action to 
enforce NRS 608.160,10 NRS 608.100,11 or NRS 613.12012 in the district court.13  Because NRS 
608.160 does not expressly mention whether employees may privately enforce its terms, a 
private cause of action must be implied if the dealers are allowed to pursue their claims under the 
statute.14  Whether a private cause of action can be implied is a question of legislative intent.15  
To ascertain the Legislature’s intent, the Nevada Supreme Court must examine the entire 
statutory scheme, reason, and public policy.16  The Nevada Supreme Court was guided by three 
factors originally set forth by the U.S. Supreme Court: (1) whether the plaintiffs are “‘of the class 
for whose [e]special benefit the statute was enacted’”; (2) whether the legislative history 
indicates any intention to create or to deny a private remedy; and (3) whether implying such a 
remedy is “‘consistent with the underlying purposes of the legislative [sch]eme.’”17  The three 
factors are not necessarily entitled to equal weight; the determinative factor is always whether 
the Legislature intended to create a private judicial remedy.18  Without this intent, the U.S. 
Supreme Court has stated, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no 
matter how desirable that might be as a policy matter, or how compatible with the statute.”19  
                                                 
8 Wood v. Safeway, Inc., 121 Nev. 724, 729, 121 P.3d 1026, 1029 (Nev. 2005). 
9 Id. 
10 It is unlawful for employers to take employees’ tips. 
11 It is unlawful for employers to require employees to rebate compensation earned and paid 
12 It is unlawful for managers and shift bosses to receive gratuities from employees as a condition of employees’ 
employment. 
13 The Court analyzed whether a private cause of action was implied by the statutes by looking closely at NRS 
608.160 and then extending that analysis to NRS 608.100 and NRS 613.120 because they were included within the 
Labor Commissioner’s authority in the same manner as NRS 608.160 and because all three statutes dealt with 
unlawful employer conduct. 
14 NRS 608.160 provides:  
Taking or making deduction on account of tips or gratuities unlawful; employees may divide tips or 
gratuities among themselves. 
1. It is unlawful for any person to: 
                        (a) Take all or part of any tips or gratuities bestowed upon his employees. 
(b) Apply as a credit toward the payment of the statutory minimum hourly wage established by 
any law of this State any tips or gratuities bestowed upon his employees. 
2. Nothing contained in this section shall be construed to prevent such employees from entering 
into an agreement to divide such tips or gratuities among themselves. 
15 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thorpe, 123 Nev. ___, ___, 170 P.3d 989, 993 (Nev. 2007) (citing U.S. Design & Constr. v. 
I.B.E.W. Local 357, 118 Nev. 458, 461, 50 P.3d 170, 172 (Nev. 2002) and Sports Form v. Leroy’s Horse & Sports, 
108 Nev. 37, 40-41, 823 P.2d 901, 903 (Nev. 1992)). 
16 U.S. Design, 118 Nev. at 461, 50 P.3d at 172. 
17 Sports Form, 108 Nev. at 39, 823 P.2d at 902 (quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)); see generally Cal. v. 
Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981) (explaining that, while congressional intent to create a private right of action 
is dispositive, that intent can often be determined by considering the Cort factors). 
18See generally Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001); Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 
575 (1979) (explaining that not all of the Cort factors are necessarily entitled to equal weight and that the “central 
inquiry remains whether Congress intended to create, either expressly or by implication, a private cause of action”). 
19Alexander, 532 U.S. at 286-87; but see id. at 287 (noting that the function of common-law courts in implying a 
cause of action might differ from that of federal tribunals). 
The absence of an express provision providing for a private cause of action to enforce a statutory 
right strongly suggests that the Legislature did not intend to create a privately enforceable 
judicial remedy.20 
 The first factor does not clearly favor finding intent to create or intent to deny a private 
remedy21 and, under the second factor, the legislative history is largely silent.  Because the 
statute requires the Labor Commissioner to enforce the statutes and provide an adequate 
administrative remedy for violations, the third factor of whether a private remedy is consistent 
with the statutory scheme weighs in favor of finding no private cause of action.  Allowing a 
private cause of action when there is already administrative enforcement could create undesirable 
inconsistencies.  Furthermore, there is an adequate administrative remedy available: the Labor 
Commissioner has the authority to hold hearings.  The Labor Commissioner must render a 
written decision that sets forth detailed findings of fact and conclusions of law within 30 days of 
the hearing.  The Labor Commissioner’s duty to hear and resolve enforcement complaints is not 
discretionary, however.  The Labor Commissioner’s decision may then be challenged by 
petitioning the district court for judicial review and the district court will review it de novo. Only 
after this process can the aggrieved party appeal to the Nevada Supreme Court.  Because the 
dealers did have access to an adequate administrative mechanism, a finding of legislative intent 
to create a parallel private remedy is precluded.  Because no private remedy is implied, the 
dealers had no right to obtain relief in the district court under NRS 608.160.  As a result, the 
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that summary judgment in favor of the Wynn was proper.   
Second, the Nevada Supreme Court found that declaratory relief was not available to the 
dealers because the dealers sought more than declaratory relief in the district court: they also 
sought interpretation of the modified policy, injunctive relief, and damages.  This was more than 
simply a determination of rights under a statute because they sought to avoid the policy 
altogether and to obtain damages.  Accordingly, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the 
district court properly denied the dealers’ request for declaratory relief. 
Third, the Nevada Supreme Court found that the dealers failed to demonstrate the 
existence of a genuine issue of material fact regarding their breach of contract claim.  The 
dealers argued that the March 28 policy contained two provisions constituting an enforceable 
written contract, despite admitting that they were at-will employees: (1) the dealers would share 
tips and (2) the tip-pooling and distribution policy was subject to modification by majority dealer 
vote.  The dealers argued that the Wynn breached the terms of the employment contract when it 
unilaterally modified the policy.  The Nevada Supreme Court has recognized that at-will 
employers may unilaterally modify the terms of employment and at-will employees have no 
contractual rights arising from the employment relationship that that limit the employer’s ability 
                                                 
20 Richardson Constr. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 123 Nev. 61, 65, 156 P.3d 21, 23 (Nev. 2007) (citing Sports Form, 
108 Nev. at 40-41, 823 P.2d at 903); see also Maldonado v. Dominguez, 137 F.3d 1, 7 (1st Cir. 1998) (noting that 
there is a “strong presumption” against inferring a private cause of action); Vikco Ins. Services, Inc. v. Ohio Indem., 
82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 442, 447 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (explaining that, because courts are not to “insert what has been 
omitted from a statute,” courts will assume that the legislature will make its intent to create a private cause of action 
clear through direct, understandable, and unmistaken terms). 
21 The inquiry is not whether appellants would benefit from the statute, but whether the Legislature intended to 
confer a right on employees as a class.  See Sierra Club, 451 U.S. at 294; Cort, 422 U.S. at 78.  Here, NRS 
608.160(1) regulates and focuses on the employer’s conduct.  NRS 608.160 does not entitle each individual 
employee to the tips and gratuities “bestowed upon” him, since it expressly allows employee tip-sharing 
agreements.  Consequently, while it appears that the statute was enacted at least in part to protect employees, it is 
less clear from the statutory language that the Legislature intended to confer upon those employees a private 
remedy.   
to prospectively hire and fire employees and to change the terms of employment.22  The Nevada 
Supreme Court has also recognized that an employer may prevent implied contractual liability by 
including a disclaimer in their employment handbooks.23  Therefore, the Wynn was free to 
modify employment terms with respect to future employment and, because the handbook 
expressly stated that any policies were subject to unilateral modification, the March 28 policy 
provisions did not rise to the level of an enforceable contract as a matter of law.  As a result, the 
Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court properly granted summary judgment on 
the dealers’ breach of contract claim.   
 
(2) The Wynn’s appeal from the district court’s order denying it attorney fees 
 
 The proper standard of review when a district court orders refusal of attorney fees is the 
abuse of discretion standard.24  Under NRS 18.010(2)(b), the district court may award attorney 
fees to a prevailing party when it finds that a claim was frivolous or brought or maintained 
without reasonable ground or to harass the prevailing party.  The district court did not find that 
the claim was frivolous or brought or maintained without reasonable ground or to harass the 
prevailing party and thus the Nevada Supreme Court concluded that the district court rightfully 
refused to award attorney fees.  The law in this matter was complex and unsettled so the claims 
made by the dealers were reasonably supportable.  Therefore, the Nevada Supreme Court 
determined that the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees. 
 
Conclusion 
 Because the Labor Commissioner enforces labor laws in Nevada, there is no parallel 
private cause of action to enforce NRS 608.160, NRS 608.100, or NRS 613.120.  The dealers 
had no standing to independently seek declaratory relief regarding the aforementioned statutes’ 
application.  The dealers’ breach of contract claim failed to demonstrate a genuine issue of 
material fact because it failed to show that the March 28 policy constituted unalterable and 
enforceable terms of employment.  As a result, the district court properly granted the Wynn’s 
motion for summary judgment and denied the dealers’ motion for partial summary judgment.  
Finally, because the dealers had reasonable grounds on which to assert their claims, the district 
court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to award attorney fees.  Consequently, the Nevada 
Supreme Court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment and order denying attorney fees. 
                                                 
22 Camco, Inc. v. Baker, 113 Nev. 512, 936 P.2d 829 (Nev. 1997); Southwest Gas Corp. v. Ahmad, 99 Nev. 594, 668 
P.2d 261 (Nev. 1983). 
23 D’Angelo, 107 Nev. at 708 n.4, 819 P.2d at 209 n.4. 
24 Miller v. Jones, 114 Nev. 1291, 1300, 970 P.2d 571, 577 (Nev. 1998). 
